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People often misrecognize objects that are similar to those they have previously encountered. 
These mnemonic discrimination errors are attributed to shared memory representations (gist) 
typically characterized in terms of meaning. In two experiments, we investigated multiple 
semantic and perceptual relations that may contribute: at the concept level, a feature-based 
measure of concept confusability quantified each concept’s tendency to activate other similar 
concepts via shared features; at the item level, rated item exemplarity indexed the degree to 
which the specific depicted objects activated their particular concepts. We also measured visual 
confusability over items using a computational model of vision, HMax, and an index of color 
confusability. Participants studied single (Experiment 1, N = 60) or multiple (Experiment 2, N 
= 60) objects for each basic-level concept, followed by a recognition memory test including 
studied items, similar lures, and novel items. People were less likely to recognize studied items 
with high concept confusability, and less likely to falsely recognize their lures. This points to 
weaker basic-level semantic gist representations for objects with more confusable concepts 
because of greater emphasis on coarse processing of shared features relative to fine-grained 
processing of individual concepts. In contrast, people were more likely to misrecognize lures 
that were better exemplars of their concept, suggesting that enhanced basic-level semantic gist 
processing increased errors due to gist across items. False recognition was also more frequent 
for more visually confusable lures. The results implicate semantic similarity at multiple levels 
and highlight the importance of perceptual as well as semantic relations. 
 


















Memory for unique experiences depends on the ability to discriminate between events that 
share multiple overlapping features. For example, we may misrecognize an unknown car in a 
car park as one we have just hired because it is similar in type and color. Memory theory 
explains these mnemonic discrimination errors in terms of a gist shared between incoming 
information and previously encoded representations (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Gist is 
assumed to embody essential meaning shared by multiple items, but the representations 
underpinning gist are poorly understood. Mnemonic discrimination errors are observed for a 
wide range of materials including pictures, words, and narratives (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). 
More direct evidence also suggests that multiple semantic relations may contribute to the 
tendency to falsely recognize similar items as having been studied (Brainerd et al., 2008; Cann 
et al., 2011; Coane et al., 2016; Montefinese et al., 2015). Moreover, although gist is typically 
conceptualized as semantic, shared perceptual information may also be important (Koutstaal et 
al., 2003; Pidgeon & Morcom, 2014). Here, we combined objective measures of semantic and 
perceptual similarity with a linear mixed modelling approach to tease apart multiple influences 
on mnemonic discrimination in one exploratory study and one confirmatory, preregistered 
study. 
 
Studies using categorized pictures suggest that semantic relations at different organizational 
levels may impact mnemonic discrimination. In the typical task, individuals study pictures of 
multiple exemplars of basic-level concepts (e.g., several cats). At test, memory probes include 
studied items (e.g., the same cat) together with lure items belonging to the same studied basic-
level concepts (e.g., a different cat), as well as novel items that do not belong to any of the 
studied concepts (e.g., a snake) (Koustaal et al., 1999; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997). 
Participants must decide whether or not they have previously been shown each picture. 
Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) found that people were about 24% more likely to falsely endorse 
the related lures as “old” than they were to endorse unrelated novel items, and subsequent 
studies have found a similar pattern. Intuitively, studied items and lures (e.g., a different cat) 
tend to be semantically as well as perceptually similar. Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) attributed 
these memory errors to processing of semantic and/or perceptual gist. Without specifying the 
relative roles of these kinds of relations, gist has been proposed to reflect properties like 
similarity that are shared between studied exemplars and lures (e.g., Gutchess & Schacter, 
2012; Koutstaal et al., 2003; Pidgeon & Morcom, 2014; Slotnick & Schacter, 2004). 
 
Variants of the categorized picture task have also been used in which studied and lure objects 
were related at the superordinate-category level (e.g., land animals: a cat, a horse, a cow), rather 
than at the basic level. In these tasks, lures in the recognition memory test (e.g., a different land 
animal, such as a lion) are related to studied items by membership of the same superordinate 
category (Bowman et al., 2019; Seamon et al., 2000). As for the basic-level version of the task, 
false recognition is more frequent to lures than to unrelated novel items. The findings from 
both versions of the categorized pictures task suggest that mnemonic discrimination of pictures 
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depends on multiple semantic as well as perceptual relations, although these studies could not 
distinguish the different influences. Such results are also consistent with studies using verbal 
materials in which studied items and lures are semantically related either by superordinate 
category (Brainerd et al., 1995) or at a higher level such as a narrative (Reyna et al., 2016).  
 
According to fuzzy trace theory, lures elicit false recognition errors when a gist memory 
representation is not opposed by a detailed memory representation of the related studied items 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). The gist memory is an episodic trace that represents meanings and 
relations shared by sets of events, but the informational content of these relations is not 
specified (Brainerd et al., 2008; Roediger et al., 2001). In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
paradigm (DRM) the studied word lists (e.g., bed, rest, awake) are all associated to a non-
presented critical lure (e.g., sleep) (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Frequent false 
recognition of the critical lures is attributed to these backward associations rather than to shared 
meaning. However, although critical lures are not typically semantically similar to most studied 
list items (e.g., sleep is not very similar to bed), they do share other semantic relations (e.g., 
familiarity and meaningfulness; Brainerd et al., 2008). Preliminary data suggest that lure words 
that are highly similar to studied items or share thematic information may elicit additional 
errors that cannot be explained by associative strength alone (Cann et al., 2011; Coane et al., 
2016; Montefinese et al., 2015). Coane et al. (2016) showed that people were more likely to 
misrecognize lure words when studied lists shared semantic features and category membership 
with the lures as well as being associatively related. However, the between-list comparison 
could not identify specific effects of feature similarity or category membership. Montefinese 
et al. (2015) more directly investigated the effects of feature similarity using an index of the 
number of shared semantic features between pairs of concepts derived from norms for 
production frequency (McRae et al., 2005; Montefinese et al., 2013). After studying sets of 
categorically related words (e.g., car, bicycle, truck), participants were more likely to falsely 
endorse as “old” unstudied items that shared more semantic features to their studied items (e.g., 
bus compared to plane) (see also Montefinese et al., 2018). However, as there was no baseline 
novel item condition, it is unknown whether the effects of feature similarity on false alarms 
reflected a real effect on memory or a modulation of response bias.  
 
There is less agreement about the role of perceptual similarity in mnemonic discrimination. 
While fuzzy trace theory characterizes false recognition of similar lures in terms of semantic 
gist, other theories explain it in terms of generic similarity and therefore also predict errors due 
to perceptual relations between studied items and lures. In global matching models, false 
recognition (like true recognition) reflects feature overlap with stored memory traces, including 
visual context as well as semantic relations (Arndt & Hirshman, 1998; Arndt, 2010). Likewise, 
pattern separation/completion accounts describe mnemonic discrimination in terms of 
complementary computational processes that act to minimize overlap between new and 
existing memory traces along multiple dimensions of similarity, and to reinstate stored traces 
in response to partial cues at test (Wilson et al., 2006; Yassa & Stark, 2011). Several studies 
using verbal material have suggested that perceptually-driven errors can occur when lures 
rhyme with lists of studied rhyming words (Budson et al., 2003; Watson et al., 2003; Watson 
et al., 2001). However, in the majority of studies, which have presented words visually (for an 
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exception see Reyna & Kiernan, 1994), these errors cannot be attributed simply to sensory 
properties of the stimuli but may also reflect similarity of phonological and/or orthographic 
representations. Further evidence for perceptual influences on mnemonic discrimination comes 
from studies showing effects of shared perceptual context in the form of distinctive fonts (Arndt 
& Reder, 2003). Such effects have also been demonstrated when lure words are not also 
semantically associated with studied items (Burnside et al., 2017). 
 
The effects of semantic and perceptual relations are more difficult to separate for pictorial 
material, because some semantic features of objects can be directly perceived (e.g., it can be 
seen from an image whether an object < has legs >, < is red >). To isolate the effects of semantic 
similarity on mnemonic discrimination of pictures, Koutstaal et al. (2003) compared memory 
for sets of colored drawings of abstract and concrete objects. While concrete images depicted 
meaningful objects that were exemplars of the same basic-level concept, as in the standard 
categorized pictures task, the sets of abstract images were created to be pre-experimentally 
meaningless but perceptually similar. False recognition was about 10% higher for lures related 
to studied concrete than abstract categories, supporting a specific role for semantic as opposed 
to perceptual gist (for a replication, see Pidgeon & Morcom, 2014). Perceptual effects were 
suggested by above-zero false recognition of abstract objects, although this conclusion 
assumed that the perceptual relatedness of the concrete and abstract objects was matched and 
that the abstract objects were not processed semantically. This second assumption was 
questioned by subjective reports from Pidgeon and Morcom (2014)’s participants of 
spontaneous verbal labelling of the abstract images. Therefore, this paradigm could not 
unambiguously identify distinct semantic and perceptual contributions to mnemonic 
discrimination errors. Perceptual effects are suggested by findings that people make errors to 
lures that are rotated photographs of studied stimuli, in old/new (Motley & Kirwan, 2012) as 
well as forced-choice (Brady et al., 2008) recognition tasks. In such cases the task is to identify 
the same image, so in that sense the lures are related semantically to the studied object and the 
two elements difficult to separate. However, increasing the perceptual (rotational) difference 
does reduce lure errors (Motley & Kirwan, 2012). There is also recent evidence of perceptual-
level interference in true recognition in a retrieval-induced forgetting task as a result of 
similarity of object shape and color (Reppa et al., 2020). In these studies only one dimension 
is varied at a time, so perceptual and semantic variables have not been shown to influence 
memory for the same items. Konkle et al. (2010) separated these elements more objectively, 
with semantic and perceptual distinctiveness ratings in a task using large sets of pictures 
organized at the basic level. They found that mnemonic discrimination errors in a forced choice 
recognition task were slightly more frequent for larger sets of objects that had been rated as 
less semantically distinctive, but perceptual effects were not significant. Their two ratings were 
relatively uncorrelated, although it cannot be assumed that perceptual properties did not 





The Current Research 
The studies reviewed above have established that semantic relations between studied and 
unstudied items are a key driver of mnemonic discrimination errors, but it remains unclear what 
kind of semantic information is critical. Moreover, although gist is usually conceptualized as 
semantic, perceptual similarity may also be important, particularly for rich pictorial material. 
The two experiments reported here used objectively quantified dimensions to investigate the 
effects of semantic and perceptual similarity on mnemonic discrimination in a typical 
categorized pictures task. In this task, items are pictures of individual objects, so lures are 
different exemplars of the same basic-level concept. We operationalized semantic similarity at 
two distinct organizational levels: at the concept level, indexing the relations between the basic-
level concepts, and at the item level, indexing the relations between individual exemplars and 
their basic-level concepts. Perceptual similarity was also quantified using properties shared 
between items. 
 
We used feature overlap to measure semantic similarity at the concept level. A large body of 
experimental evidence supports the view that semantic memory is structured in terms of 
features. According to distributed feature models, like the Conceptual Structure Account (CSA; 
Tyler & Moss, 2001), concepts are represented in the brain by their features 
(e.g., < has legs >, < has eyes >, < has a tail >) in a connectionist system in which the mutual 
co-activation of the feature nodes determines the semantic processing (McRae et al., 1997; 
Tyler & Moss, 2001; Vigliocco et al., 2004). The statistical regularities of semantic features, 
derived from property norms, have proven to be a useful way of characterizing the structure 
and content of semantic representations (Devereux et al., 2014; Garrard et al., 2001). The most 
prominent statistical characteristic assumed to structure the semantic space and determine how 
concepts are processed is concept confusability (Clarke & Tyler, 2014). Concept confusability 
measures the degree to which a concept’s semantic features are shared with other concepts 
(e.g., many animals < have ears >). Highly shared features (e.g., < has legs >, < has eyes >, < 
has a tail >) provide coarse information about the superordinate categories to which a concept 
belongs (e.g., land animals), and support decisions that depend only on this coarse-grained 
information. In contrast, accessing specific basic-level concepts (e.g., tiger) requires finer-
grained semantic processing that includes features more distinctive to the particular concept 
(e.g. < has stripes >), and support more specific tasks like naming. In the current work, we used 
concept confusability as an index of information shared across the basic-level concepts. 
 
To complement the examination of concept confusability, we assessed effects of semantic and 
perceptual relations at the item level, via properties of the individual depicted exemplars. Such 
properties are likely to be important determinants of people’s ability to correctly reject lures 
which are unstudied exemplars of studied basic-level concepts. Previous studies have shown 
that basic-level processing is enhanced for objects that are more representative of a stored 
basic-level conceptual representation. Pictures that are better exemplars are categorized faster 
at the basic level than pictures that are poorer exemplars (Barry et al., 1997; Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980). Therefore, we used ratings of item exemplarity to index how well a picture 
corresponded to its basic-level representation. We assumed that similarity between a picture 
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and its conceptual representation would facilitate gist processing at the item level, i.e., 
information shared across exemplars of each concept. 
 
To operationalize perceptual similarity, we drew on an established computational model of 
perceptual processing. The Hierarchical Model and X (HMax; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; 
Serre et al., 2007) models different hierarchical stages of the ventral processing stream in 
different layers, progressing from early visual cortex (V1) to posterior inferior temporal cortex 
(IT). The C1 layers correspond to increasingly position- and scale-invariant early visual cortex 
(V1/V2) which maintain feature specificity, while C2 layers simulate the extrastriate visual 
area cells (V4/IT) that integrate visual features from previous layers to represent object shape. 
Measures based on these two layers have been validated in studies of visual object recognition 
that have distinguished the time courses and neural correlates of semantic versus visual 
processing (Clarke & Tyler, 2014; Clarke et al., 2015). Here, we generated measures of the 
visual confusability of each image with others in the set, defined in terms of the properties 
indexed by C1 and C2 (e.g., orientation and shape). Lastly, since the HMax model does not 
represent color, we computed a novel index of color confusability using the CIELab color 
space, known to be an approximation of human color perception (Rubner et al., 2000). 
 
In a first, exploratory, experiment, we examined mnemonic discrimination in a simple task in 
which participants studied one exemplar for each basic-level concept and were later tested on 
a single lure (Bakker et al., 2008; Lacy et al., 2011; Reagh et al., 2016; Stark et al., 2013; Yassa 
et al., 2011). Then in a second, preregistered, confirmatory experiment, we sought to replicate 
and explain the findings of the first by increasing the number of studied exemplars of each 
basic-level concept. Successful mnemonic discrimination requires accurately identifying 
studied items and rejecting similar lures. Since distinct processes may contribute to memory 
for these two trial types, performance is typically assessed using separate measures of true and 
false recognition, and many studies focus mainly on false recognition. To adjust for response 
criterion, sensitivity measures derived from signal detection theory can be computed from rates 
of endorsement of studied and lure items as “old”, relative to unrelated unstudied items. 
Equivalent measures of studied relative to lure item endorsement can also assess overall ability 
to discriminate studied items from lures in memory. In both experiments, we used generalized 
linear mixed effects models, which provide parameter estimates to index participants’ memory 
sensitivity and response bias that are equivalent to those provided by the equal variance signal 
detection theory framework (DeCarlo, 1998). This allowed us to preserve and take into account 
variability across items as well as participants, which results in an increased accuracy and 
generalizability of the parameter estimates (Baayen et al., 2008; Quené & van den Bergh, 
2008).  
 
In this task, the studied and lure exemplars of the same basic-level concept can be regarded as 
sharing a semantic gist and possibly also a perceptual gist across items. We reasoned that 
concept confusability would impact mnemonic discrimination by weakening the basic-level 
conceptual representations shared by studied items and their lures. If a concept is highly 
confusable with other concepts because they share semantic features, the concept’s distinctive, 
basic-level representation will be less likely to be encoded. Thus, we expected that studied 
8 
 
objects whose concepts are more confusable would be less likely to be recognized and their 
corresponding lures more likely to be successfully rejected. For example, if a cherry is studied 
– a concept with high confusability due to multiple highly shared features like < does grow on 
trees >, < is sweet >, < is edible > – a weak representation of “cherry” will be encoded alongside 
the details of the particular exemplar. In contrast, if a foot is studied – a concept with low 
confusability due to its few shared features and its distinctive features < has toes >, < is found 
at the end of a leg > – a strong representation of “foot” will be more likely to be encoded. In a 
memory test, the same exemplar of “cherry” will thus be less likely to be recognized than the 
same exemplar of “foot”, since memory for the former is weaker. For the same reason, for 
lures, a different exemplar of “cherry” will be more likely to be successfully rejected than a 
different exemplar of “foot”, given weaker encoding of the studied concept. In terms of the 
item-level metrics, we assumed that objects with higher rated item exemplarity would more 
strongly engage the basic-level conceptual processing shared by studied items and lures. We 
therefore predicted that higher exemplarity lures would be more likely to be misrecognized. 
Lastly, based on similar logic we predicted more frequent false recognition of more visually 
confusable lures. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
The study included sixty participants aged 18-33 years (M = 21; SD = 2.2; 15 male, 45 female). 
Eleven further participants were excluded from data analysis: 7 due to errors in stimulus lists 
or data acquisition issues, 1 due to misunderstanding of instructions, and 3 who did not meet 
the inclusion criterion for English fluency. The sample size was determined a priori using the 
simR package in R (Version 1.0.4; Green & Macleod, 2016). We powered the study for an 
interaction of condition (lure vs. new) × concept confusability, based on a pilot study 
suggesting an effect size equivalent to Cohen’s d = 0.17 (OR = 1.35). With N = 60 we had 
87.30 % power to detect such an effect at alpha = .05. Inclusion criteria were fluency in English 
(spoken since at least the age of 5 years), and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Data from 
an additional group of older participants collected at the same time will be included in a 
separate report. Participants were compensated financially or with course credits. They were 
contacted by local advertisement and provided informed consent. The study was approved by 
the University of Edinburgh Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Ref. 278-1617/1). 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were pictures of objects corresponding to 180 of the 638 basic-level concepts in the 
Centre for Speech, Language and the Brain property norms (the CSLB norms; Devereux et al., 
2014). These 180 basic-level concepts comprised 9 members of each of 20 different 
superordinate categories (Appliance, Bird, Body Part, Clothing, Container, Drink, Flower, 
Food, Fruit, Furniture, Invertebrate, Kitchenware, Land Animal, Music, Sea Creature, Tool, 
Toy, Vegetable, Vehicle, Weapon) and half were living and half non-living. We sourced two 
images for each basic-level concept. One set of 180 was a subset of images used by Clarke and 
Tyler (2014), and the other was compiled from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS; 
Brodeur et al., 2014) and from the Internet. Each study list comprised 120 images of exemplars 
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of different basic-level concepts, selected evenly from the superordinate categories (i.e., 6 
different basic-level concepts per superordinate category). Each test list consisted of 180 items: 
60 studied images, 60 similar lures (i.e., novel images corresponding to the other 60 studied 
basic-level concepts), and 60 novel items (i.e., novel images of basic-level concepts that had 
not been studied). Three filler trials prefaced both study and test phases. We generated 6 
different study and test lists which fully counterbalanced the allocation of the basic-level 
concepts and the two sets of images to conditions (studied, lure, and novel).  
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of a single study phase followed by a recognition test phase. Between 
study and test phases, participants completed standardized cognitive tests (not reported here) 
for 15 minutes. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Participants were tested individually in the laboratory. At study, they 
viewed one image at a time, and rated how pleasant it was from 1 (very unpleasant) to 5 (very 
pleasant). Participants were not informed of a later memory test. Images were presented against 
a white background within a 15 × 13 cm area in the center of a computer screen, and viewed at 
a distance of approximately 50 cm. Trials were self-paced. At test, participants viewed one 
image at a time every 3 s and judged each as “old” or “new” using the keyboard, indicating at 
the same time whether they were confident in this judgement. Responses were made using the 
“Z” and “A” keys when judging an item as “old” with high and low confidence, respectively; 
the “M” and “K” keys when judging an item as “new” with high and low confidence, 
respectively, and mappings of responses to hands counterbalanced over conditions. After 
completing the test phase, each participant also completed the concept familiarity or the item 
exemplarity ratings. The entire procedure took approximately 50 minutes and participants were 



















Variables of Interest 
The concept- and-item level variables of interest are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Schematic Depiction of Stimuli Used in Both Experiments 
 
Note. Rows show individual exemplars with the highest (right side) and lowest (left side) scores on each 
concept- and-item level experimental variable. Panel A illustrates concept confusability: the basic-level 
concept name is given alongside images of both exemplars representing it in Experiment 1. High 
confusability concepts share more semantic features with other concepts. Panel B illustrates item-level 
measures for individual images of objects. Item exemplarity is an index of similarity between the 
depicted exemplar and the concept representation. The perceptual measures define confusability of an 
item as the similarity with its most similar neighbor in the set. C1 and C2 were obtained from gray-





Concept Level  
Concept confusability. Our measure of concept confusability was based on that of Clarke and 
Tyler (2014), but we used a gentler weighting system and an updated set of property norms 
(Devereux et al., 2014). The property norms provide a matrix of features associated with 638 
objects (e.g., has 4 legs, has stripes and lives in Africa are features of a zebra). These were 
collected by presenting participants with a written concept name and asking them to produce 
properties of the concept. Taxonomic features (e.g., < is a bird >) were excluded as they refer 
to a superordinate category and are not normally regarded as true semantic features (Taylor et 
al., 2012). Based on the feature norms, each object can be represented by a binary vector. 
Semantic similarity between concepts was computed as the cosine angle between feature 
vectors in a semantic feature matrix in which each concept was represented by a binary vector 
indicating whether each feature was associated with the concept (1) or not (0). Concept 
confusability with all the other concepts in the set was then calculated by a weighted sum of 
the similarities in which each weight was the between-concept similarity itself, i.e., the sum of 
squared similarities (see Figure 1). This measure emphasized feature sharedness of each 
concept with those concepts with which it shared many semantic features. We also calculated 
the number of features for each concept from the same norms. 
Concept familiarity. Thirty of the 60 participants judged the 360 pictures representing the 180 
concepts. Following Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980), we asked subjects to judge the 
familiarity of each picture “according to how usual or unusual the object is in your realm of 
experience”. Concept familiarity was defined as “the degree to which you come in contact with 
or think about the concept”. Participants were required to give their response on a 7-point scale 
(1 = completely unfamiliar, 7 = completely familiar) using the keyboard. For each picture, 
familiarity scores were averaged over all participants (see Supplemental Materials for its 
theoretical relevance). 
Item Level   
Item exemplarity. To obtain a measure of item exemplarity we used a rating task in which 
pictures were presented together with their verbal label. Following Taylor et al. (2012), we 
asked participants to judge “how closely each picture resembles your mental image of the 
object”, giving their response on a 7-point scale (1 = poor picture of concept word, 7 = excellent 
picture of concept word). The 30 participants who did not provide familiarity ratings were 
asked to provide these item exemplarity scores, which were averaged to give a single score per 
picture (see Figure 1). 
Perceptual confusability. Measures capturing the low- and high-level visual attributes of each 
picture were derived for each of the 360 images (2 per concept) used to represent our basic-
level concepts. We calculated two indices for each dimension which embodied two alternative 
hypotheses about how perceptual similarity between images might affect mnemonic 
discrimination. Although the second measure was preregistered for Experiment 2, for clarity 
we only report the results from the first in the main paper, since it gave a coherent picture 
across the two experiments (see also Discussion). We first extracted HMax estimates of low- 
and high-level visual object information: a C1 response related to early visual cortex (V1/V2), 
and a C2 response related to V4/posterior IT. Response vectors from the C1 and C2 layers were 
computed for grey-scaled versions of each image. Similarity between pictures was then 
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calculated using the Pearson correlation coefficients between vectors. For the main visual 
confusability measure, for each image we defined confusability as the similarity value with its 
most similar picture (i.e., the nearest neighbor; see Figure 1). The second metric, graded visual 
confusability, was analogous to concept confusability, indexing an image’s similarity to the 
full set of images (see Supplemental Figure 4). We calculated a weighted score for each image 
by summing the squared ranks of Pearson correlations between each image i and all other 
images j, so pictures with high graded visual confusability scores were those that were similar 
to many other pictures. To obtain the ranks of all the similarity values, we first extracted the 
matrix of Pearson correlations between images as a single vector. Then, we computed the 
corresponding rank for each correlation, and transformed the vector of ranks back into a matrix. 
This allowed us to deal with negative Pearson correlations, which were assigned the lowest 
ranks.  
For each image, we also generated a nearest neighbor index of color confusability using the 
color distance package (Weller & Westneat, 2019) in R (version 3.4.3; R Core Team, 2017). 
This measure represents the degree to which the color of each item resembled that of the most 
similarly-colored item in set. After converting the RGB channels into CIELab space, we 
calculated the earth mover’s distance between each pair of images (Rubner et al., 2000). We 
then normalized the distance and transformed the distance matrix in a similarity matrix using 
the equation S = D - 1 so that similarity values ranged from 0 (lowest similarity) to 1 (highest 
similarity). Then, for each item, we retained the similarity with its most similar item in the set 
(see Figure 1). As described above for the HMax measures, we also calculated a measure of 
graded color confusability. From the similarity matrix, to obtain a single metric for each image, 
we summed the squared ranks of similarities, so higher values indicate greater color 
confusability with all the other pictures in the set (see Supplemental Figure 4).  
Nuisance Variables  
Mnemonic discrimination may be influenced by a range of other visual, phonological, lexical, 
and semantic factors in addition to the semantic and perceptual confusability measures of 
interest here. We controlled for the effect of the following nuisance variables, described in 
more detail in the Supplemental Materials: forward and backward associative strength 
estimated using a continuous association task (De Deyne & Storms, 2008; Nelson et al., 2004), 
word frequency (van Heuven et al., 2014), concreteness (Brysbaert et al., 2014), age of 
acquisition (Brysbaert & Biemiller, 2017), phonological neighborhood density (Baayen et al., 
1995), the number of non-white pixels, color entropy (Chouinard & Goodale, 2012), and 
concept familiarity (derived from our rating task; see also Taylor et al., 2012).  
Statistical Analysis 
We tested our hypotheses using a series of generalized linear mixed-effect model analyses with 
the function glmer from the lme4 package in R (version 1.1-17, Bates et al., 2015). The linear 
mixed-effect model approach affords greater robustness and generalizability of inference 
compared to the analysis of variance typically used in studies of memory (Baayen et al., 2008). 
Modelling random effects of items as well as participants is helpful in studies of memory where 
generalization to other stimulus sets as well as other participant samples is desirable (Clark, 
1973). Accuracy was modelled using a multiple linear logistic regression on participants’ 
binary recognition judgments (“new” = 0, “old” = 1) fitted by means of a logit link function. 
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Thus, rather than considering our data in terms of proportions of hits, misses, false alarms, and 
correct rejections, as in the standard recognition test analysis, we directly predicted behavioral 
outcomes from item status (i.e., studied, lure, or novel). In this way we estimated how the 
probability of judging an item as “old” depended on its actual status, and asked which of our 
variables of interest moderated this effect. The log-odds-ratio coefficients generated by the 
generalized linear mixed effect logit models are formally proportional to d' in a Gaussian signal 
detection analysis (d' ≈ .6 logOR; DeCarlo, 1998; Wright et al., 2009). This relation holds over 
a wide range of values, so logit and probit models yield equivalent results except at the 
extremes. In the Results section we therefore report effect sizes in terms of d’ equivalent for 
ease of comparison with other studies. We also performed an exploratory linear mixed-effect 
analysis of response times (RTs) at study to check whether the experimental variables would 
impact (non-speeded) decisions about item pleasantness. The results did not reveal any 
significant effects, and are not reported further (but can be found on https://osf.io/ndk83/). 
 
To test specific predictions about memory for studied items and lures, we set the reference 
level for the condition factor to “novel” so that with simple contrasts we could examine 
modulations of a) the probability of correctly identifying studied items as “old” relative to 
novel items (an index of sensitivity for studied items equivalent to d’, reflecting true memory), 
b) the probability of misrecognizing related lures relative to novel items (an index of sensitivity 
for related lures equivalent to d’, reflecting false memory). This also yielded c) the probability 
of falsely judging novel items as “old” (an index of baseline false alarms, equivalent to the 
response criterion c). So for example, an estimated d’ = 1.5 for an interaction between a 
continuous variable and the contrast of lure versus novel items, means that a one SD increase 
in that continuous variable is associated with a 1.5 x increase in d’ for lures versus novel items. 
In a final set of contrasts, we set the reference level for the condition factor to “lure” to assess 
modulations of d) the probability of endorsing studied items as “old” relative to lures (an index 
of overall sensitivity equivalent to d’). This allowed us to evaluate the effect of the semantic 
and perceptual variables on overall mnemonic discrimination performance, a net effect of their 
modulations of true and false memory (Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Loiotile & Courtney, 
2015).  
 
For each model, we specified a priori random intercepts of both participants and concepts 
(Matuschek et al., 2017). In the fixed part, our variables of interest were condition (studied, 
lure, novel), two concept-level variables (i.e., concept confusability, number of features), and 
four item-level variables (i.e., item exemplarity, C1 and C2 visual confusability, color 
confusability). Within the concept-level and item-level partitions we also included the 
corresponding interactions with condition. To minimize model complexity, and because the 
nuisance variables were moderately-to-highly intercorrelated, we performed data reduction of 
the nuisance variables with principal components analysis (PCA) using the prcomp function in 
R. PCA with varimax rotation produced a 7 factor solution which accounted for 86.14% of 
variance (see Supplemental Table 5). We then compared the goodness-of-fit between i) the 
confounds model with the original nuisance variables and ii) the reduced confounds model with 
the principal components using the corrected Akaike information criterion (AICc). We also 
complemented the goodness-of-fit measure provided by AICc with the corresponding Bayesian 
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information criterion (BIC) and the likelihood ratio test (LRT). Model selection revealed that 
the simpler confounds model with principal components provided a better goodness-of-fit (AIC 
= 14420.23, BIC = 14492.97) relative to the model with the original nuisance variables (AIC 
= 14424.65, BIC = 14519.21; for LRT for a difference between models, χ2(3) = 1.59, p = 
0.662). Thus, these 7 principal components were included as nuisance variables for our models.  
 
Model selection was carried out to determine the fixed effects structure with the best goodness-
of-fit based on sets of theoretically motivated predictors, which included concept-level, item-
level, and confound principal component variables. Starting with the most complex model, we 
used the AICc to compare progressively simpler models. At each step, we verified whether the 
exclusion of a particular set (in order, concept-level, item-level, and nuisance variables) was 
justified or not. We also supplemented this measure with the corresponding BIC and the LRT 
between models. Model comparison was performed using the AICcmodavg package (version 
2.3-1) and the anova function in R. Post-hoc analyses were conducted, and results interpreted 
after selecting the best model. All the continuous predictor variables were standardized, and 
the resulting β coefficients representing log-odd-ratios were used to calculate the corresponding 
d’ coefficients. 
Results 
The results of the mixed effects analysis for the winning model are shown in Table 1, and 
illustrated in Figure 2. Raw recognition responses by item type are reported in Supplemental 
Figure 5. The initial model comparison suggested that the full model with concept-level, item-
level, and confounds principal component variables was the most parsimonious model for the 
data. This model received the lowest AICc score (AICc = 8821.92), indicating decisive 
evidence relative to simpler models (see Supplemental Table 6). It received substantial weight 
(AICc weight = 0.98) of the total weight of the models considered, with an evidence ratio 
between the top-ranked model and the second-ranked model of 58.15. That is, the evidence 
was 58.15 times stronger for the best model. This result was also supported by a significant 
LRT in favor of the full relative to the model ranked second on the basis of AICc (χ2(7) = 
19.59, p = 0.007). Unlike AICc and LRT, BIC provided evidence in favor of the model with 
concept-level variables only as the most parsimonious model (BIC = 8991.90). However, when 
we allowed the free selection of variables rather than the comparison based on our three blocks 
(i.e., removal of concept-level, item-level, and confounds principal component variables in this 
order), BIC resulted in a better goodness-of-fit when item exemplarity and C1 visual 
confusability were included in the model together with the concept-level variables (BIC = 
8827.70). Participants’ responses were collapsed across confidence judgments as results were 
qualitatively similar when high confidence mnemonic discrimination was analyzed. 
Coefficients in Table 1 represent log-odds-ratios with the corresponding d’ effects. All the p-







Results of Experiment 1 (Novel Items as Baseline) 
 
Note. The reference level of condition is set to “novel”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Nearest neighbor perceptual 
confusability measures were reported in the model above. See Material and Methods, Variables of 





Variable Estimate d’ SE z-value  p 
(Intercept) -2.41 -1.37 0.12 -20.02 <.001 
Lure 1.71 0.95 0.07 23.09 <.001 
Studied 4.85 2.74 0.09 52.00 <.001 
Number of Features 0.13 0.07 0.08 1.66 .136 
Concept Confusability 0.28 0.15 0.08 3.44 .002 
Visual Confusability (C1) 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.85 .438 
Visual Confusability (C2) 0.20 0.10 0.09 2.28 .040 
Color Confusability 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.47 .635 
Item Exemplarity 0.18 0.09 0.07 2.55 .025 
Lure × Number of Features -0.31 -0.17 0.07 -4.25 <.001 
Studied × Number of Features -0.10 -0.05 0.09 -1.11 .332 
Lure × Concept Confusability -0.28 -0.15 0.07 -3.96 <.001 
Studied × Concept Confusability -0.54 -0.29 0.09 -6.30 <.001 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C1) 0.16 0.10 0.07 2.28 .040 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C1) -0.19 -0.10 0.08 -2.24 .041 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.15 -0.06 0.09 -1.67 .136 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.11 -0.05 0.10 -1.07 .332 
Lure × Color Confusability -0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.48 .635 
Studied × Color Confusability -0.11 -0.06 0.09 -1.17 .317 
Lure × Item Exemplarity 0.20 0.13 0.08 2.57 .025 




Effects of Semantic and Perceptual Variables on Mnemonic Sensitivity in Experiment 1 
 
 
Note. Plots show effects of semantic and perceptual variables on modulation of sensitivity. The plot 
lines represent the effect of the predictor variables on the probabilities of endorsing studied items as 
“old” relative to novel items (light blue), lures as “old” relative to novel items (orange), and studied 
items as “old” relative to lures (purple). Panel A, B, and C show the effects of concept confusability, 
item exemplarity, and C1 visual confusability in Experiment 1. See Material and Methods, Variables of 





Sensitivity for Studied Relative to Novel Items 
The probability of judging a studied item as “old” was compared to the probability of judging 
a novel item as “old”. Overall, discrimination of studied from novel items was very good 
(simple effect on d’ = 2.74; 95% CI: 2.65, 2.83). The results also showed modulations of 
concept- and item-level variables on sensitivity for studied items. Images whose concepts were 
more confusable with other concepts in the set were less likely to be remembered (Figure 2A; 
interaction of concept confusability with studied items on d’ = -0.29; 95% CI: -0.38, -0.20). 
Pictures judged with high exemplarity were also less likely to be remembered (Figure 2B; 
interaction of item exemplarity with studied items on d’ = -0.10; 95% CI: -0.19, -0.01). Lastly, 
participants were less likely to recognize items that were visually confusable in terms of their 
low-level representations (Figure 2C; interaction of C1 with studied items on d’ = -0.10; 95% 
CI: -0.19, -0.01). No other variable significantly modulated sensitivity for studied items. 
 
Sensitivity for Lure Relative to Novel Items 
The probability of judging a lure item as “old” was compared to the probability of judging a 
novel item as “old”. As expected, participants were more likely overall to incorrectly endorse 
lures than novel items (simple effect on d’ = 0.95; 95% CI: 0.88, 1.03). The concept-level 
semantic variables also had substantial effects on lure sensitivity. Fewer errors were observed 
for lure images whose concepts were more confusable with other concepts in the set (Figure 
2A; interaction of concept confusability with lure on d’ = -0.15; 95% CI: -0.23, -0.07), as well 
as for those with a greater number of semantic features (interaction of number of features with 
lure on d’ = -0.17; 95% CI: -0.25, -0.10). At the item-level, false recognition was more likely 
for lures rated as better exemplars of their concept (Figure 2B; interaction of item exemplarity 
with lure on d’ = 0.13; 95% CI: 0.05, 0.21), as well as for lures whose early visual 
representations (such as line orientation) were more confusable (Figure 2C; interaction of C1 
with lure on d’ = 0.10; 95% CI: 0.03, 0.18). No other variable significantly modulated 
sensitivity for lure items. 
 
Sensitivity for Studied Relative to Lure Items 
The results of the analysis that examined the net modulation of participants’ ability to 
discriminate studied items from lures are shown below in Table 2, and illustrated in Figure 2. 
Overall, performance was fairly good (simple effect on d’ = 1.79; 95% CI: 1.71, 1.87). Both 
concept- and-item level variables modulated this effect. Mnemonic discrimination was poorer 
for items with high concept confusability (Figure 2A; interaction of concept confusability with 
studied items on d’ = -0.13; 95% CI: -0.21, -0.06), but was better for concepts with a larger 
overall number of semantic features (interaction of number of features with studied items on 
d’ = 0.12; 95% CI: 0.04, 0.20). At the item level, objects judged as having high item 
exemplarity were also less well discriminated (Figure 2B; interaction of item exemplarity with 
studied items on d’ = -0.23; 95% CI: -0.31, -0.15), as were images with greater low-level (C1) 
visual confusability (Figure 2C; interaction of C1 with studied items on d’ = -0.20; 95% CI: -





Results of Experiment 1 (Lure Items as Baseline) 
 
Note. The reference level of condition is set to “lure”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Nearest neighbor perceptual 
confusability measures were reported in the model above. See Material and Methods, Variables of 
Interest, and Results for details. SE = Standard Error. 
  
False Alarms to Novel Items 
Overall, participants were good at identifying unstudied novel items as “new” (intercept on d’ 
= -1.37; 95% CI: -1.50, -1.25). This baseline was also modulated by both concept- and item-
level semantic variables. False alarms were more frequent for highly confusable novel items 
(Supplemental Figure 5A; simple effect of concept confusability on d’ = 0.15; 95% CI: 0.07, 
0.23), and for those with high rated item exemplarity (Supplemental Figure 5B; simple effect 
of item exemplarity on d’ = 0.09; 95% CI: 0.02, 0.17). The baseline probability of false alarms 
to novel items was also modulated by the C2 index of visual confusability. People were more 
likely to falsely endorse novel items as “old” if they were highly confusable in terms of late 
visual representations (such as global shape) (simple effect of C2 on d’ = 0.10; 95% CI: 0.01, 
0.19). No other variable significantly modulated baseline false recognition of novel items. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we investigated the effects of conceptual and perceptual confusability on 
mnemonic discrimination of objects, using objective measures of similarity within a 
generalized linear mixed model framework. The findings for both concept-level and item-level 
variables support the proposal that semantic and perceptual properties shared by studied and 
lure objects contribute to mnemonic discrimination. At the concept level, studied objects whose 
concepts were more confusable because they shared features with other concepts were less 
likely to be remembered, and the corresponding lures were more likely to be correctly rejected. 
In contrast, at the item level, while studied objects that were better exemplars of their concept 
were less well recognized, lure objects with this property triggered more frequent errors. 
Likewise, people also misrecognized more lures that were visually confusable with their 
nearest neighbor. Overall, these effects resulted in poorer mnemonic discrimination between 
      













Studied × Number of Features 0.21 0.12 0.08 2.80 .005 
Studied × Concept Confusability -0.25 -0.13 0.07 -3.49 <.001 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C1) -0.35 -0.20 0.07 -4.76 <.001 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C2) 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.40 .686 
Studied × Color Confusability -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.93 .354 
Studied × Item Exemplarity -0.40 -0.23 0.08 -5.07 <.001 
19 
 
studied and lure objects with high concept confusability, high item exemplarity, and high visual 
confusability.  
 
The effects of concept confusability on sensitivity for studied items and lures suggest that when 
concepts were more confusable with other concepts, memory was weaker for the basic-level 
information shared by the studied items and lures. Our metric of concept confusability was 
based on an established model of conceptual structure and existing norms for feature properties 
of common concepts (Devereux et al., 2014; Tyler & Moss, 2001). This measure reflects 
conceptual processing of shared information across a set of items. The more confusable 
concepts shared more features with other concepts, and had fewer distinctive features not 
shared with other concepts. Our results suggest that if people remember less distinctive 
information about an object’s concept, they are less likely to remember the object. The same 
logic applies to lures: lures with more confusable concepts can be more easily rejected as 
unstudied because memory is weaker for the concept shared with the studied item. This 
interpretation is supported by Taylor et al.'s (2012) finding that domain-level categorization 
decisions (living/ non-living judgments) were faster for concepts with more shared features, 
while basic-level naming was faster for concepts with more distinctive features. Thus, the 
efficiency of basic-level processing depended on the relative emphasis on coarse, cross-concept 
processing of shared features relative to fine-grained processing of individual concepts with 
distinctive features. Here, we did not find any modulation of study phase RT by concept 
confusability or other experimental variables. This probably reflected the use of self-paced 
judgments at study and prioritization of accuracy over speed given our primary concern with 
memory accuracy. From a fuzzy trace theory viewpoint, gist memory contributes positively to 
both veridical memory and lure false recognition (Brainerd et al., 2008; Brainerd et al., 1995). 
In this typical categorized pictures task, the gist is at the basic level since studied and lure 
objects are exemplars of the same basic-level concepts (e.g. a dog was studied, and a different 
dog appeared as a lure). In Experiment 1, this gist was impoverished for highly confusable 
concepts, reducing both recognition of the studied items and gist-related errors for the lures. 
Overall, mnemonic discrimination between these items was poorer. 
 
While people were better able to successfully reject lures with more confusable concepts, false 
alarms to novel items with more confusable concepts were increased (see Supplemental Figure 
5A). These items did not share a basic-level concept with any studied items but did share 
semantic features with them to varying degrees. This result is similar to that reported by 
Montefinese et al. (2015) for verbal stimuli. Participants studied sets of categorically related 
words (e.g., car, truck, scooter for the vehicle category) and were more likely to falsely 
recognize unstudied words which had more shared semantic features (e.g., tram). In that study, 
the novel words were related to the studied sets by membership of common superordinate 
categories, like the novel objects in the current study. Thus, it is possible that this higher-level 
semantic similarity caused these items to be more difficult to discriminate in memory. 
However, since both this result and Montefinese et al.'s (2015) finding were modulations of 
raw false alarms, we cannot rule out the alternative possibility that they reflect an effect of 




The results for item exemplarity show that sensitivity for both studied items and lures depended 
on semantic processing at the item level as well as the concept level. As predicted, higher 
exemplarity lures were more likely to be falsely identified as studied, consistent with enhanced 
activation of basic-level representations. This suggests that participants tended to remember 
having studied the corresponding basic-level concept (e.g., giraffe in Figure 1) even if they did 
not remember the specific studied exemplar. These data are consistent with Barry et al.'s (1997) 
finding of facilitated basic-level naming for high exemplarity objects. However, studied items 
rated as better exemplars of their basic-level concept were more likely to be forgotten. This 
suggests that better exemplars were more likely to trigger reactivation of basic-level gist 
information at test, and perhaps less likely to elicit retrieval of specific information. It is not 
consistent with a simple modulation of basic-level gist at encoding, which should increase true 
recognition as well as lure errors.  
 
Our initial analysis of the effects of perceptual relations on memory used graded indices of 
confusability computed across the whole set of stimuli (see Supplemental Figure 4 and Table 
7). However, since the graded weighting prioritized similarity over many items, the high 
confusability items had generic visual properties rather than being similar to any specific items 
in the set. These observations motivated the analysis using perceptual confusability measures 
with a stronger weight, restricted to nearest neighbors only. As Figure 1 shows, these metrics 
had a quite different profile from the across-set measures (compare to Supplemental Figure 4). 
For C1, more confusable items were those with a distinctive linear orientation, shared with at 
least one other specific item in the set (the neighbor), although more color-confusable items 
were relatively uniform as well as bland. The analysis using these measures revealed that lures 
that shared low-level (C1) visual features with their nearest neighbor were more likely to be 
misrecognized. However, the corresponding studied items were more likely to be forgotten. 
We consider these effects of nearest neighbor visual confusability further below, in light of the 
results of Experiment 2. 
 
The data point to multiple gist-like effects on mnemonic discrimination reflecting both 
semantic and perceptual dimensions along which studied items and lures were similar to other 
studied objects. Here, the lures were different exemplars of studied basic-level concepts, so 
variables increasing emphasis on processing at this level tended to trigger errors, while 
variables indexing processing shared with other concepts tended to reduce them. We have 
proposed that these effects reflect strengthening or weakening of basic level conceptual 
memory representations. However, there is an alternative mechanism by which lures with more 
confusable concepts could be better discriminated: they might be more easily rejected using 
the memory editing strategy of recall-to-reject (Gallo, 2004; Brainerd et al., 2003). When a lure 
triggers recollection of similar studied items, people can avoid gist-related errors by comparing 
the recollected information with the lure (e.g., they decide that a white dog was not presented, 
because they remember having studied a black dog). A similar mechanism might also apply to 
differences in performance for lures that were related to studied items in other ways, at the item 
level. It was important to establish whether our results would generalize to a situation in which 




In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate Experiment 1’s novel semantic and perceptual effects 
on memory, and test whether these modulations of mnemonic discrimination would generalize 
to a task where the use of a recall-to-reject strategy was prevented. We therefore amended the 
procedure so that multiple different exemplars of each basic-level concept were studied. Once 
people have to recall more than 5 different studied items in order to reject a single lure, a recall-
to-reject strategy becomes ineffective, particularly if the set size varies within the study list 
(Gallo, 2004). In Experiment 2, participants studied sets of either two or eight different 
exemplars of the same basic-level concept. Our preregistered prediction was that if Experiment 
1’s finding of reduced false recognition of lures with more confusable concepts was due to 
impoverished representations of these basic-level concepts in memory, Experiment 2 would 
show a similar effect. With more studied exemplars per concept we might also observe 
enhanced effects of concept confusability on mnemonic discrimination in Experiment 2 
compared to Experiment 1, and for set size 8 compared to set size 2. However, if the recall-to-
reject account is correct, concept confusability would either be associated with increased lure 
errors in Experiment 2, or would have no effect. In terms of item-level processing, we expected 
that effects might be similar, or more pronounced because of the larger studied sets. 
 
Materials and Methods 
The experimental methods were preregistered with the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/3h7kf). 
Participants 
The study included sixty adults aged 18-33 years (M = 21.2; SD = 3.2, 12 male, 48 female).  A 
further ten participants were excluded from data analysis: 9 due to technical issues with 
recording responses, 1 due to poor performance at test (using the preregistered criterion of d’ 
for studied item discrimination of less than 3 SD from the mean). The sample size was 
determined with sensitivity analyses setting alpha to .05. The principal effect of interest was 
the overall effect of concept confusability on lure false recognition (interaction of concept 
confusability × lure versus novel baseline; collapsed across set size). Simulations with simR 
suggested that with N = 60 we would have .92 power to detect a small effect (OR = 0.70; 
equivalent to Cohen’s d = 0.20; the effect size in Experiment 1 was equivalent to d = 0.15, 
although as outlined above, we expected this effect to be larger, if present). For the higher order 
interaction of concept confusability with study set size condition (lures for set size 8 versus 2), 
N = 60 could detect a medium-sized interaction of concept confusability × condition × lure 
versus novel baseline at 0.99 power (OR = 0.58; equivalent to Cohen’s d = 0.30). Data from a 
group of older participants collected at the same time will be included in a separate report. All 
participants were fluent English speakers (since at least the age of 5), and had normal or 
corrected to-normal vision. Participants were recruited by local advertisement and provided 
informed consent. They received either course credit or an honorarium. The study was 





Except where specified, stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. For each of the 200 basic-
level concepts, 9 different sets of images were obtained for a total of 1800 images. Each study 
list included 600 items: 480 in the large sized sets (i.e., set size 8) and 120 in the small sized 
sets (i.e., set size 2). Each test list consisted of 300 items: 120 studied images (60 from set size 
8 and 60 from set size 2), 120 similar lures (60 unstudied exemplars of studied basic-level 
concepts from set size 8 and 60 from set size 2, and 60 novel items whose basic-level concepts 
had not been studied). Three filler trials prefaced both the study and the test phase. We 
generated one study and test list for each participant which randomized the allocation of the 
concepts and their exemplar images to conditions (i.e., studied, lure, and novel) and set size (2 
and 8) with the constraint that half the concepts in each condition (item type and set size) were 
living and half non-living. 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of a single study phase followed by a recognition test phase with 
interspersed standardized cognitive tests (not reported here) for 15 minutes. Stimuli were 
presented with MATLAB (R2018b, The MathWorks) using PsychToolbox (Kleiner et al., 
2007; Version 2.0.14). The procedure was otherwise the same of Experiment 1 except that 
trials during the study phase were not self-paced, but presented every 3 s.  
Statistical Analysis 
The variables of interest and nuisance variables (see Supplemental Table 8) were identical to 
those used in Experiment 1, but the item metrics were recomputed for this larger set of images. 
Analyses reported here were based on the nearest neighbor metrics of perceptual confusability 
for reasons noted in Experiment 1, Materials and Methods, Variables of Interest, and the results 
for graded perceptual confusability metrics are given in the Supplemental Material 
(Supplemental Table 11). Item exemplarity ratings were again collected from the participants 
after the test phase. As the concepts were identical to those used in Experiment 1, we used the 
same concept familiarity values collected previously. The main preregistered statistical 
analyses collapsed across the large and small study set sizes were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1, as were the model selection procedures. We also examined a priori the 
modulatory effects of set size (i.e., set size 8 vs set size 2), but as this variable had no significant 
effects we focus here on the results collapsed over the two set sizes (see Supplemental Table 
10 for the results of the full model). Lastly, we again conducted a linear mixed-effect analysis 
of study phase RTs (results not reported, see https://osf.io/ndk83/). 
 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, there was decisive evidence in favor of the full model including concept-
level, item-level, and confounds principal component variables, relative to simpler models (see 
Supplemental Table 9). The full model was the most parsimonious, receiving the lowest AICc 
score (AICc = 17597.96), and substantial weight (AICc weight = 0.89) relative to the other 
models, with an evidence ratio between the top-ranked model and the second-ranked model of 
7.83. This result was also supported by a significant LRT in favor of the full relative to the 
model ranked second on the basis of AIC (χ2(7) = 18.16, p = 0.011). Unlike Experiment 1, BIC 
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now provided evidence in favor of the model with both concept- and-item level variables as 
the most parsimonious model (BIC = 17780.99). The results of the mixed effects analysis of 
the full model are shown below in Table 3, and illustrated in Figure 3. All the p-values are 
FDR-multiple comparison corrected (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Raw recognition 
responses by item type are reported in Supplemental Figure 6. 
 
Table 3 
Results of Experiment 2 (Novel Items as Baseline) 
  
Variable Estimate d’ SE z-value p  
(Intercept) -2.70 -1.55 0.10 -26.65 <.001 
Lure 2.34 1.33 0.07 32.00 <.001 
Studied 4.20 2.44 0.08 54.42 <.001 
Number of Features 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.03 .978 
Concept Confusability 0.31 0.16 0.07 4.30 <.001 
Visual Confusability (C1) -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -1.13 .364 
Visual Confusability (C2) 0.22 0.10 0.08 2.83 .011 
Color Confusability 0.07 0.03 0.07 1.07 .375 
Item Exemplarity 0.14 0.08 0.07 2.11 .067 
Lure × Number of Features -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.12 .949 
Studied × Number of Features -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -1.28 .301 
Lure × Concept Confusability -0.25 -0.12 0.07 -3.59 <.001 
Studied × Concept Confusability -0.53 -0.29 0.07 -7.32 <.001 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C1) 0.26 0.14 0.07 3.66 <.001 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C1) 0.20 0.10 0.07 2.66 .016 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.16 -0.06 0.08 -1.95 .082 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.17 -0.07 0.08 -2.05 .071 
Lure × Color Confusability 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.70 .536 
Studied × Color Confusability -0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.95 .422 
Lure × Item Exemplarity 0.29 0.18 0.07 4.03 <.001 
Studied × Item Exemplarity -0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.82 .483 
 
Note. The reference level of condition is set to “novel”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Nearest neighbor perceptual 
confusability measures were included in the model above. See Material and Methods, Variables of 






Effects of Semantic and Perceptual Variables on Mnemonic Sensitivity in Experiment 2 
 
 
Note. Plots show effects of semantic and perceptual variables on modulation of sensitivity. The plot 
lines represent the effect of the predictor variables on the probabilities of endorsing studied items as 
“old” relative to novel items (light blue), lures as “old” relative to novel items (orange), and studied 
items as “old” relative to lures (purple). Panel A, B, and C show the effects of concept confusability, 
item exemplarity, and C1 visual confusability in Experiment 2. See Material and Methods, Variables of 




Sensitivity for Studied Relative to Novel Items 
As in Experiment 1, discrimination of studied from novel items was very good (simple effect 
on d’ = 2.44; 95% CI: 2.36, 2.51). Concept confusability impaired sensitivity for studied items 
which were more likely to be forgotten (Figure 3A; interaction of concept confusability with 
studied items on d’ = -0.29; 95% CI: -0.36, -0.21). However, the effect of item exemplarity on 
true recognition was no longer significant (Figure 3B; interaction of item exemplarity with 
studied items on d’ = -0.03; 95% CI: -0.10, 0.05). Also, more visually similar studied items 
were now more (rather than less) likely to be correctly recognized (Figure 3C; interaction of 
C1 with studied items on d’ = 0.10; 95% CI: 0.03, 0.18). No other variable significantly 
modulated sensitivity of studied items.  
 
Sensitivity for Lure Relative to Novel Items 
As in Experiment 1, participants were generally more likely to judge lures than novel items as 
“old” (simple effect on d’ = 1.33; 95% CI: 1.26, 1.41). The direction of the concept 
confusability effect was also unchanged: false recognition of lures was again relatively less 
likely for pictures whose concepts shared many semantic features with other concepts (Figure 
3A; interaction of concept confusability with lure on d’ = -0.12; 95% CI: -0.20, -0.05). At the 
item level, lure errors were again more frequent for items with higher rated exemplarity (Figure 
3B; interaction of item exemplarity with lure on d’ = 0.18; 95% CI: 0.11, 0.26), and with higher 
visual confusability in terms of low-level visual representations (Figure 3C; interaction of C1 
with lure on d’ = 0.14; 95% CI: 0.07, 0.22). No other variable significantly modulated 
sensitivity for lure items. 
 
Sensitivity for Studied Relative to Lure Items 
The results of the analysis that examined participants’ ability to discriminate studied items from 
lures are shown below in Table 4, and illustrated in Figure 3. Overall, participants were fairly 
good at discriminating studied items from similar lures (simple effect on d’ = 1.10; 95% CI: 
1.06, 1.15). Both concept- and-item level variables modulated this effect. Similar to 
Experiment 1, studied items with high concept confusability were less likely to be correctly 
discriminated from highly confusable lures (Figure 3A; interaction of concept confusability 
with studied items on d’ = -0.16; 95% CI: -0.21, -0.12). However, unlike Experiment 1, more 
semantic features did not improve discrimination (interaction of number of features with 
studied items on d’ = -0.05; 95% CI: -0.10, 0.00). Studied concepts whose pictures were judged 
to have high exemplarity were again less likely to be discriminated from their lure exemplars 
(Figure 3B; interaction of item exemplarity with studied items on d’ = -0.21; 95% CI: -0.26, -
0.16). Lastly, participants were less likely to correctly discriminate studied items with high 
color confusability (interaction of color confusability with studied items on d’ = -0.07; 95% 
CI: -0.12, -0.02). Unlike Experiment 1, the effect of C1 visual confusability was no longer 
significant (Figure 3C; interaction of C1 with studied items on d’ = -0.04; 95% CI: -0.09, 0.01). 






Results of Experiment 2 (Lures as Baseline) 
 
Note. The reference level of condition is set to “lure”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Nearest neighbor perceptual 
confusability measures were reported in the model above. See Material and Methods, Variables of 
Interest, and Results for details. SE = Standard Error. 
 
False Alarms to Novel Items 
Participants correctly identified most unstudied novel items as “new” (intercept on d’ = -1.55; 
95% CI: -1.65, -1.44). As predicted, and as in Experiment 1, items with high concept 
confusability were more likely to be falsely recognized as “old” (Supplemental Figure 6A; 
simple effect of concept confusability on d’ = 0.16; 95% CI: 0.09, 0.24). At the item level, false 
alarms to novel items were modulated by C2 visual confusability. People were more likely to 
misrecognize novel items with more confusable late visual representations (i.e., their overall 
shape) (simple effect of C2 on d’ = 0.10; 95% CI: 0.02, 0.17). No other variable significantly 
modulated baseline false recognition of novel items. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 closely reproduced Experiment 1’s procedures, except that participants studied 
multiple exemplar images of each basic-level concept. This allowed us to test whether the 
variables contributing to mnemonic discrimination were altered when people could not 
effectively use a recall-to-reject strategy. The effect observed in Experiment 1 for concept 
confusability was qualitatively the same in Experiment 2: people were again less likely to 
misrecognize lures with high concept confusability (reductions in d’ by factors of -0.15 and -
0.12 in Experiments 1 and 2), and more likely to forget more confusable studied items (d’ 
reductions of -0.29 and -0.29 in Experiments 1 and 2). Therefore, the pattern of findings in 
Experiment 1 cannot be explained by a facilitation of recall-to-reject for lures with more 
confusable concepts. Instead, the data suggest that processing shared features over concepts 
weakened the representation of basic-level conceptual information in memory. Thus, concept 
confusability reduced recognition of both studied and lure exemplars and impeded the ability 
to discriminate between them in memory.  
 
      













Studied × Number of Features -0.09 -0.05 0.04 -1.91 .079 
Studied × Concept Confusability -0.28 -0.16 0.04 -6.65 <.001 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C1) -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -1.47 .186 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.25 .847 
Studied × Color Confusability -0.12 -0.07 0.04 -2.89 .007 
Studied × Item Exemplarity -0.35 -0.21 0.04 -8.32 <.001 
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As in Experiment 1, semantic relations over items also had a marked effect on lure errors, 
which were again more frequent for lures that were better exemplars of their concept (d’ 
increasing by factors of 0.13 and 0.18 in Experiments 1 and 2). This suggests that at test, people 
were more likely to respond “old” to high exemplarity lures because they remembered having 
studied the corresponding basic-level concepts. However here, unlike in Experiment 1, item 
exemplarity did not significantly affect true recognition of studied items (d’ effects of -0.10 
and -0.03 in Experiments 1 and 2). We do not place much emphasis on this null finding, since 
the between-Experiment interaction between study set size, item exemplarity and old versus 
novel items was also not significant (see Supplemental Table 12). It may be that there is an 
effect on true recognition which is too small for us to detect consistently. Alternatively, the 
effect observed in Experiment 1 may have been weakened by the increase in set size: for 
example, exemplarity of individual studied items might matter less when multiple exemplars 
are studied. Despite this, the effect for lures remained robust, as did the effect on overall 
discrimination between studied items and lures. 
 
For the perceptual item-level variables, as already noted in Experiment 1, the graded measures 
did not seem to capture our initial intuition that some lures would be highly visually confusable 
with specific studied items. Therefore, we focused instead on exploratory analyses that better 
tested our original prediction that such lures would be more frequently misrecognized. The 
nearest neighbor metrics yielded consistent findings in the two experiments in this regard. For 
the low-level C1 measure, lures that were more visually confusable with another item were 
more likely to be misrecognized (d’ increased by factors of 0.10 and 0.14 for Experiments 1 
and 2). However, the effects of C1 visual confusability on recognition of studied items differed 
between the two experiments. While in Experiment 1 more confusable items were less likely 
to be remembered, in Experiment 2 they were more often remembered (d’ modulations of -
0.10 and 0.10). This reversal may reflect a genuine difference due to the increase in study set 
size in Experiment 2: for example, if more highly similar nearest neighbors were introduced 
by use of multiple studied exemplars of each basic-level concept. Further data will be required 
to establish whether this is a robust finding. As a result of this different effect for studied items, 
visual confusability did not significantly reduce overall mnemonic discrimination of studied 
items from lures in Experiment 2, unlike for Experiment 1. The current results point to a 
particular salience of simple visual features like line orientation for false recognition of lures 
(see Figure 1). We explore the possible reasons for this below.  
General Discussion 
In this research, we used objective and model-based measures to show for the first time that 
multiple semantic and perceptual relations contribute to people’s ability to discriminate objects 
in memory. This approach allowed us to assess simultaneous influences of semantic and 
perceptual relations between objects while controlling for the potential effects of other 
variables known to influence mnemonic discrimination. Using generalized linear mixed model 
analysis we were also able to directly model the effects of predictors on binary memory 
outcomes, and generalize the results over concepts as well as participants (DeCarlo, 1998; 
Wright et al., 2009). In both experiments, studied objects that shared semantic features with 
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many other concepts were more difficult to recognize, and lures whose corresponding studied 
object had many shared features were easier to correctly identify as new. In contrast, 
misrecognition was more frequent for lure objects that were more representative of their basic-
level concept. The findings demonstrate distinct effects of semantic relations among concepts, 
and semantic relations between concepts and their exemplars. Simple perceptual properties 
shared with other studied images also contributed to misrecognition of lures, suggesting that 
image as well as concept properties are important in mnemonic discrimination for pictures.  
 
To assess the effects of semantic similarity on memory we used a concept confusability metric 
derived from a feature-based model of semantic memory (Devereux et al., 2014; Tyler & Moss, 
2001). Previous studies have shown that conceptual structure understood in terms of feature 
relations between concepts can explain a range of phenomena, such as differences in the 
processing of living and nonliving concepts in healthy people (McRae et al., 1997; Randall et 
al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2004) and specific impairments in 
neuropsychological patients (Forde & Humphreys, 1999; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; 
Warrington & Shallice, 1984). For example, Moss et al. (1997) described a post-encephalitic 
patient who was very poor at differentiating between highly similar objects (e.g., tiger versus 
panther), but had no difficulty in determining the superordinate category of an object (e.g., land 
animals; see also Tyler et al., 2004). This dissociation between finer-grained and coarser 
categorical levels of conceptual processing converges with Taylor et al.'s (2012) finding that, 
in healthy people, processing highly shared semantic features facilitated domain-level 
categorization decisions but impeded basic-level naming. 
 
The current study is the first to show that feature-based conceptual structure impacts mnemonic 
discrimination. The results converge with earlier evidence from Montefinese et al. (2015) that 
semantic feature similarity increases false alarms to unstudied items (see also Montefinese et 
al., 2018). Our data confirm that overlapping semantic features impact mnemonic sensitivity 
indices that adjust false recognition for response criterion, and further show that concept 
confusability also affects true recognition. The results are also in line with Coane et al. (2016)’s 
suggestion that specific effects of semantic categorical relations on false recognition reflect 
feature similarity at least in part (see also Coane et al., 2020). We have interpreted this finding 
in terms of gist memory traces representing basic-level conceptual information. According to 
fuzzy trace theory, memory outcomes reflect the relative accessibility of two kinds of memory 
traces encoded in parallel: verbatim traces containing specific representations of the studied 
items, and gist traces representing their meaning traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Memory for 
studied items is supported by both verbatim and gist traces, and false memory for related lures 
occurs when gist but not verbatim traces are retrieved. Although the theory does not specify 
the informational content of gist, the logic of the mnemonic discrimination task suggests that 
the relevant gist information in any given task is the information that is shared between the 
studied items and lures. Our results support this assumption, and suggest that different levels 
of semantic similarity have distinct effects on mnemonic discrimination. In the categorized 
pictures task used here, studied items and lures shared basic-level concepts. Concept 
confusability – a similarity metric reflecting shared processing of conceptual features – 
weakened the representations of individual concepts in memory and therefore reduced gist-like 
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effects on memory for studied items and lures. The net effect on mnemonic discrimination was 
also negative: for concepts that were more confusable, people were less able to discriminate in 
memory between studied items and lures.  
 
In contrast, item exemplarity – similarity between an exemplar item and its concept – 
strengthened activation of the concept and therefore increased gist-like effects, at least for lures. 
Exemplarity, or image agreement, defines a relation between an image exemplar and its basic-
level concept, and is closely related to typicality (Barry et al., 1997; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 
1980). A typical exemplar shares more features with other members of its category (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975) and may therefore more strongly elicit a gist memory trace that overlaps with 
representations of other exemplars. In line with this, we found that people falsely recognized 
more high exemplarity basic-level lures. Together with the findings for concept confusability, 
the data suggest that both concept-level and item-level variables impacted mnemonic 
discrimination via modulations of basic-level memory representations. A few prior studies 
have examined the specific semantic information that gist is based on. These have used specific 
stimuli or measures that focused on a single type of relation (Cann et al., 2011; Coane et al., 
2016; Montefinese et al., 2015). Our use of multiple measures enabled effects of relations at 
different levels to be examined at the same time.  
 
As outlined in the Introduction, studies using a range of different task materials also suggest 
that the content of the memory representations critical for mnemonic discrimination varies. 
Studies using pictures, words, situational themes, and narratives as to-be-remembered material 
find that lures that are related to studied items at these different semantic levels are 
misrecognized as studied, implicating gist representations at different levels. The results for 
novel items offer converging evidence that the effects of different semantic relations on lure 
errors may depend on the nature of the lures to be discriminated. In both experiments, while 
concept confusability improved rejection of lures, it increased false alarms to unrelated novel 
images. Although neither these objects (e.g., a panther) nor other exemplars of their basic-level 
concepts had been studied (e.g., a different panther), people had studied other items from the 
same superordinate categories (e.g., a cat and a dog) as well as further items with which they 
shared semantic features (e.g. a chair, which < has legs >). Since no basic-level gist memory 
was ever encoded for these items’ concepts, its effects could not be impoverished by emphasis 
on features shared with other concepts. However, if the coarse semantic activation not only 
reduced within-concept gist but enhanced across-concept gist, it would lead some novel objects 
with many shared features to be classified as “old”. A similar argument was made by 
Montefinese et al. (2015) for verbal material. Our finding is also in line with previous studies 
showing that novel pictures (Bowman et al., 2019; Seamon et al., 2000) and words  (Brainerd 
et al., 1995; Coane et al., 2016, 2020) belonging to the same superordinate category as studied 
items are more likely to be misrecognized than unrelated novel items. The current study and 
that of Montefinese et al. (2015) are the first to directly demonstrate that shared semantic 
features can increase false recognition of pictures and words, respectively. However, both these 
findings could be due to modulations of response criterion rather than effects on memory (see 
also Montefinese et al., 2018). People’s bias to respond “old” versus “new” can change item-
by-item in response to properties of the test probes (Heit et al., 2003; Kent et al., 2018). For 
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example, processing shared semantic features might increase attention to items in the absence 
of any retrieval of a gist trace. Further studies with an additional unrelated novel item baseline 
condition will be required to adjudicate between these two possibilities.  
 
We have discussed the findings for both concept confusability and item exemplarity in terms 
of their effects on concept gist shared by studied items and lures. However, unlike concept 
confusability, item exemplarity did not affect memory for studied items as would be expected 
according to fuzzy trace theory if it modulated encoding of gist traces. Recognition of higher 
exemplarity studied items was numerically reduced in both experiments, significantly so in 
Experiment 1. The effects of exemplarity or typicality on recognition memory are relatively 
unexplored, but several studies suggest that words that are more typical members of their 
superordinate category tend to be better recalled, mediated in part by clustering by category 
(Schmidt, 1996). One possibility is that the restriction of the effect of exemplarity to lure errors 
derived from the way that exemplarity as an item-level variable assessed gist. Unlike concept 
confusability, which directly indexed shared features among concepts, item exemplarity 
indirectly indexed shared features among exemplars via judgments of the strength of the 
relations between exemplars and their concepts. Prioritization of relations between exemplars 
and concepts may have increased sensitivity to test phase cueing of memory traces by images 
eliciting strong basic-level representations. Greater overlap between an exemplar and its basic-
level concept may therefore have increased the degree to which a lure image could trigger 
retrieval of a gist trace, but not the degree to which a studied image could elicit gist encoding 
at this level. Currently, norms are not available for the semantic features that are shared 
between individual pictured exemplars of a concept but, based on the assumptions of fuzzy 
trace theory, we would predict that similarity between studied items and lures on such measures 
would be associated with increases in recognition of both types of items, and reduced 
discrimination between the two.  
 
The current data also support the proposal that mnemonic discrimination errors are driven by 
perceptual as well as semantic similarity (Bowman et al., 2019; Brady et al., 2008; Burnside et 
al., 2017; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Motley & Kirwan, 2012; Seamon et al., 2000). We 
examined the effects of perceptual relations on memory using item-level measures of visual 
properties of the images. Lure items with greater low-level (i.e. C1) visual confusability with 
another image in the set were more likely to be misrecognized as “old”. As these nearest 
neighbor analyses were exploratory, the results need to be treated with some caution, but the 
metrics yielded consistent results across the two experiments in the direction originally 
predicted for visual confusability effects. The findings suggest that perceptual effects on false 
recognition of lures are robust, at least for early visual properties like line orientation. The 
contrasting lack of consistent effects of perceptual confusability measured with graded metrics 
points to a dependence of this effect on specific similarity between lures and individual items 
in the set. We considered whether defining measures of perceptual (and semantic) similarity 
only between test items and each participant’s set of studied items might provide a clearer 
picture; however, this was not possible due to very high collinearity with the original indices 




Our data converge with the handful of previous studies that have directly addressed perceptual 
effects. It is difficult to draw strong conclusions about color effects since we did not find 
consistent effects over experiments, and Reppa et al. (2020) (see Introduction) used a very 
different task and measures from ours. However, the current results are broadly in line with 
their finding that perceptual similarity (in their case, of shape) can cause interference in 
memory. Our data also converge with those of Brady et al. (2008) who found that people made 
errors to lures that were different-view images of studied objects, as well as to different 
exemplars of studied concepts. They used a forced choice recognition task, in which 
discrimination performance is generally substantially better than in old/new recognition, and 
may rely more on familiarity (Migo et al., 2009) and/or processing fluency (Voss et al., 2012). 
Our findings (and those of Motley and Kirwan, (2012); see Introduction) broadly converge 
with these earlier data to suggest that perceptual as well as semantic similarity both influence 
mnemonic discrimination regardless of the recognition task format. Our model-based measures 
specifically implicate low-level visual similarity in this task, but future studies may show that 
higher-level attributes like shape and view also contribute independently.  
 
Others have found that perceptually similar but pre-experimentally meaningless lures trigger 
false recognition (Koutstaal et al., 2003; Pidgeon & Morcom, 2014; Slotnick & Schacter, 
2004). For example, Slotnick and Schacter (2004) found that meaningless shapes that were 
visually related to studied items were more likely to be misrecognized relative to novel 
unrelated shapes. While visual similarity was not formally measured, lures tended to have 
similar linear orientation to their studied items. Our data are also in line with fMRI studies that 
have shown engagement of early visual cortex during false recognition of visually similar 
picture lures, whether or not these are also semantically related, supporting the interpretation 
that such activity represents enhanced visual processing during lure misrecognition (Bowman 
et al., 2019; Garoff-Eaton et al., 2006; Gutchess & Schacter, 2012; Slotnick & Schacter, 2004). 
Thus, behavioral and neuroimaging results converge on the idea that mnemonic discrimination 
errors can be elicited by both semantic and perceptual relations. The use of model-based 
metrics allowed us to go further by indexing perceptual properties directly, and addressing 
concerns that people may bring conceptual processing to bear even on experimentally 
unfamiliar stimuli (Pidgeon & Morcom, 2016).  
 
These findings support earlier suggestions that gist-based memory can be perceptual as well as 
conceptual (Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997). This possibility is consistent with fuzzy trace 
theory’s opponent processes, if gist is not restricted to information about meaning. A fuller 
understanding of mnemonic discrimination needs to take into account the nature of the relations 
and representations involved. Our finding that semantic relations between concepts and items 
had different effects on mnemonic discrimination suggests that different semantic relations 
may impact memory in ways that are modulated by task demands. An important question to 
address in future studies will be whether manipulations previously shown to impact measures 
of gist reliance (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) can be shown to have dissociable effects on the 
contributions of semantic and perceptual similarity to mnemonic discrimination. Our results 
are also in line with previous data suggesting that semantic influences on memory errors go 
beyond associative activation (Brainerd et al., 2008; Cann et al., 2011; Coane et al., 2016, 2020) 
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The activation/monitoring theory explains false recognition in terms of associative strength 
(Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Roediger et al., 2001). On this view, studying a list of words 
produces an automatic associative activation that spreads through the lexical semantic system, 
and false recognition occur when lures accrue substantial activation through this process. A 
strength of the activation/monitoring theory is that the associative relations assumed to 
determine memory errors are quantifiable (Roediger et al., 2001). However, this account cannot 
explain the above findings. It is also inconsistent with perceptual effects on lure errors as it 
specifies that misrecognition stems from activation of lure representations at study. Similar 
lures which have no pre-existing associations to studied items are unlikely to be spontaneously 
generated at encoding (Arndt, 2010). Associative activation also cannot explain lure errors 
reflecting spatial proximity to the location of a studied object (Reagh et al., 2016, 2014). 
  
Global-matching models can explain lure errors that reflect perceptual as well as semantic 
relations (Arndt & Hirshman, 1998; Arndt, 2010; Hintzman, 1988). According to models like 
MINERVA2 (Arndt & Hirshman, 1998), there is no gist memory trace, but mnemonic 
discrimination errors occur to the degree that lures presented at test are globally similar to 
multiple traces previously stored at encoding, without specification of the nature of the similar 
features. Such a retrieval-based mechanism may also explain why some variables – here, item 
exemplarity and visual confusability – impact lure errors but not memory for studied items. In 
fuzzy-trace theory’s conjoint recognition model, lure-specific factors could modulate the 
probability of similarity responding at test, and therefore lure errors (Brainerd et al., 1999; 
Brainerd & Wright, 2005), although its processing tree model does not explicitly separate 
encoding and retrieval processes. An explicit model of encoding and retrieval contributions is 
offered by the pattern separation and completion processes at the heart of the complementary 
learning systems model (Marr, 1971; McClelland et al., 1995; McNaughton & Morris, 1987; 
Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). At study, pattern separation by the hippocampus ensures that 
specific memory traces are generated. When this separation fails memory traces may become 
more gist-like, and lures more likely to trigger errors (Wilson et al., 2006; Yassa & Stark, 
2011). At test, people may also fail to discriminate lures because the lures trigger pattern 
completion due to high overlap with studied items (Motley & Kirwan, 2012; Norman & 
O’Reilly, 2003; Norman, 2010; Yotsumoto et al., 2007). Hippocampal pattern separation and 
completion do not specify the types of similarity more likely to influence mnemonic 
discrimination, and predict influences of perceptual, semantic and contextual properties 
(Hunsaker & Kesner, 2013; Reagh et al., 2014; Yassa & Stark, 2011). The complementary 
learning systems model further specifies non-pattern-separated neocortical inputs that may also 
contribute to semantically-driven mnemonic discrimination errors (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; 
Pidgeon & Morcom, 2014; Wilson et al., 2006). These model predictions about specific 
encoding and retrieval operations are difficult to test with behavioral measures alone, but can 
be more directly investigated using neuroimaging measures, which enable semantic and 




In this work we used objective measures derived from established models of conceptual 
structure and low-level vision to show that semantic and perceptual relations can 
simultaneously contribute to gist-like effects in memory. The results from two experiments 
implicated relations at multiple representational levels and suggested that similarity between 
studied and unstudied items does not always impair mnemonic discrimination. The coarse 
semantic activation elicited by processing shared semantic features across concepts impeded 
memory for studied objects while reducing false alarms to lure exemplars of the same concepts. 
In contrast, a strong semantic overlap at the item-level between an object and its basic-level 
concept was associated with more frequent false recognition of lures, as was strong low-level 
visual similarity between an object and a studied image. The initial findings were replicated in 
the second experiment which increased and varied the study set size in order to rule out recall-
to-reject as an explanation for the results. Taken together, our findings point to the utility of a 
more structured and formal approach to understanding the relations underpinning gist-like 
effects in memory, and highlight the importance of image as well as concept properties in 
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The strength of associations between words is an established modifier of mnemonic 
discrimination (Deese, 1959; Roediger et al., 2001). Both forward associative strength (FAS, 
from an unstudied lure concept to a studied concept) and backward associative strength (BAS, 
from a studied concept to an unstudied lure concept ) may contribute to misrecognition and 
false recall of lures (Brainerd & Wright, 2005; Roediger et al., 2001). However, the current 
English language norms (Nelson et al., 1998) only provide data for 156 of the 200 concepts 
with semantic feature norms used in this study (Devereux et al., 2014). The Nelson et al. (1998) 
norms were also gathered decades ago (from 1973) in the US. To ensure that association scores 
were relevant for our participants, we gathered our own association data using a method similar 
to De Deyne and Storms (2008). 
Participants 
Two hundred and six participants contributed (Age: M = 24.7, SD = 8.7, 147 female, 59 male). 
Participants were recruited using social media and Mechanical Turk. They were required to 
live in the UK and be aged 18-50 years. Non-native English speakers self-evaluated their 
English ability using a scale from 0 (none) to 5 (fluent) on four dimensions: expression, 
comprehension, reading, and writing. A score of at least 16 out of 20 was required. Forty further 
participants were removed who did not meet these criteria. Each concept was seen by an 
average of 32.4 participants (SD = 2.5). 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants each rated 30 randomly chosen concepts from the 200 used in the study. For each 
concept, participants were asked to list the first three words that came to mind when reading 
the name of the concept, ranked such that the most prevalent (or first thought of) was listed 
first. Participants could also mark a word as unknown or provide less than three answers. There 
was no time limit to complete the task. 
Calculation of Mean BAS and Mean FAS 
Associations for a concept were manually sorted and counted to take account of different 
spellings, spelling mistakes, and capitalizations. Following Nelson et al. (2004), conjugated 
words and plural/singular words were transformed into the most frequent instance.  Following 
De Deyne and Storms (2008), idiosyncratic words (associations only produced once) were 
removed in the calculation of frequencies. Then, the associations were tallied for each concept 
and divided by the number of associations produced for that concept to create relative 
frequencies of each association. 
A useful metric is how much on average a specific concept is associated with the other concepts 
used in the study (De Deyne & Storms, 2008). This is referred to as mean backward associative 
strength (MBAS) and mean forward associative strength (MFAS). To calculate these, we 
followed procedures used by De Deyne and Storms (2008), and Montefinese, Zannino, and 
Ambrosini (2015). Association data were entered in a 200 x 200 matrix in which rows 
corresponded to concepts and columns to their generated associations with other concepts. We 
entered each association frequency in the corresponding cell. The MFAS was then calculated 
by averaging over frequencies in a given concept’s row, and MBAS by averaging over a given 
concept’s column.  
Word frequency 
Frequently encountered words are processed faster than words that are rarely encountered 
(Oldfield & Wingfield, 1964). Low-frequency words are correctly recognised and correctly 
rejected more often than high-frequency words (Glanzer & Adams, 1985). We used log-
transformed word frequencies from SUBTTLEX-UK, based on British English television 
subtitles (van Heuven et al., 2014). 
Concreteness 
Concreteness refers to the extent to which the concept denoted by a word refers to a perceptible 
entity (Paivio & Begg, 1971). More concrete words are easier to remember than more abstract 
words (Gorman, 1961; Paivio, 2013). We used norms from Brysbaert et al. (2014). Participants 
rated how concrete the meaning of each word was by using a 5-point scale. 
Age of Acquisition 
Age of acquisition (AoA) is known to influence memory: words learned early in life are less 
well recognized (Dewhurst et al., 1998). We used Brysbaert & Biemille's (2017) update of Dale 
and O’Rourke’s (1981) norms. 
Phonological Neighborhood Density 
The phonological neighbourhood density (PND) of a word is the number of words in the 
language which differ only by the addition, subtraction or substitution of a single phoneme 
from the target word (Luce & Pisoni, 1998). Items with high PND tend to be processed less 
quickly and/or accurately. We used norms from the CELEX database (Baayen et al., 1995). 
Visual Complexity 
The visual complexity measures reflect superficial visual characteristics of images. More 
complex stimuli may be more easily recognized (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). We included 
two different measures of image complexity: the number of non-white pixels in the image, and 
color entropy, a measure of the color variability of an image. Images with a large proportion of 
pixels sharing the same color should be less visually complex (Chouinard & Goodale, 2012). 
Color entropy was computed by finding the relative frequency of all colors that occur in the 
non-white pixels in the image and calculating the entropy of this probability distribution. 
Concept Familiarity 
We included concept familiarity as an attribute of images. In recognition memory, more 
unfamiliar pictures are better recognised than familiar pictures (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 
1980).  
Each covariate we considered in the study was standardized and the statistics that follow were 





Schematic Depiction of Additional Graded Perceptual Confusability Measures 
 
Note. Rows show individual exemplars with the highest (right side) and lowest (left side) scores on each 
metric of perceptual confusability. The graded perceptual confusability measures define confusability 
indexing an image’s overall similarity to the full set of images. C1 and C2 were obtained from gray-
scaled version of the images depicted in Figure 4. For definitions see Variables of Interest section. 
 
Table 5 
Principal Component Analysis of Nuisance Variables in Experiment 1 
 Components 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Nb of non-white pixel     0.997   
Color entropy  0.154  0.701   -0.272  0.264 
Mean BAS -0.536      -0.334 
Mean FAS -0.811       0.272 
PND                                                     -0.822 
Concept familiarity -0.156  0.710   0.258 -0.243 
Word co-occurrence         0.992    
Concreteness  -0.700      
Age of acquisition      0.921  
Word Frequency  -0.708      
 
Note. The top 7 principal components from the PCA with varimax rotation of nuisance variables. 
Cumulative variance explained is 86.14 %. 
Table 6 
Model Selection for Experiment 1 
Model  AICc ΔAICc AICcWt Cum.Wt LL 
Concept + Item + PCs 
Concept + Item 
Item + PCs 
Item 




8821.92 0.00 0.98 0.98 -4380.87 
8830.05 8.13 0.02 1.00 -4391.97 
8876.02 54.10 0.00 1.00 -4413.95 
8886.94 65.02 0.00 1.00 -4426.44 
8899.91 77.98 0.00 1.00 -4431.92 
8911.89 89.96 0.00 1.00 -4444.93 
14420.23 5598.30 0.00 1.00 -7200.10 
14430.75 5608.83 0.00 1.00 -7212.38 
 
Note. Summary of AICc results for models including concept-level, item-level, and confounds principal 






















Effects of Semantic and Perceptual Variables on Raw Recognition Measures in Experiment 1 
 
Note. Plots show effects of semantic and perceptual variables on raw recognition responses by item 
type. The plot lines represent the raw probabilities of endorsing studied items as “old” (light blue), lures 
as “old” (orange), and novel items as “old” (grey). Panel A, B, and C show the effects of concept 
confusability, item exemplarity, and C1 visual confusability in Experiment 1. Note that for concept-
level variables (concept confusability) there are data points for each concept, and for item-level 
variables (item exemplarity and C1 visual confusability) there are data points for each exemplar image. 
The clustering around discrete values of p(“old”) reflects the small numbers of observations for 
individual exemplars (see Experiment 1, Materials and Methods, Stimuli). 
Table 7 
Results of Experiment 1 Using Graded Perceptual Confusability Metrics 
  
Variable Estimate d’ SE z-value p 
(Intercept) -2.42 -1.38 0.12 -20.09 <.001 
Lure 1.73 0.96 0.07 23.37 <.001 
Studied 4.86 2.75 0.09 52.24 <.001 
Number of Features 0.15 0.08 0.08 1.94 .084 
Concept Confusability 0.29 0.16 0.08 3.61 <.001 
Visual Confusability (C1) -0.14 -0.08 0.07 -1.89 .084 
Visual Confusability (C2) 0.14 0.06 0.08 1.67 .117 
Color Confusability 0.13 0.07 0.08 1.69 .117 
Item Exemplarity 0.18 0.10 0.07 2.61 .022 
Lure × Number of Features -0.32 -0.18 0.07 -4.43 <.001 
Studied × Number of Features -0.12 -0.06 0.09 -1.40 .190 
Lure × Concept Confusability -0.27 -0.14 0.07 -3.74 <.001 
Studied × Concept Confusability -0.57 -0.30 0.08 -6.73 <.001 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C1) 0.14 0.08 0.08 1.88 .084 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C1) 0.20 0.11 0.09 2.27 .041 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.92 .355 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.11 -0.05 0.10 -1.11 .297 
Lure × Color Confusability -0.08 -0.04 0.07 -1.05 .307 
Studied × Color Confusability -0.26 -0.14 0.09 -3.00 .007 
Lure × Item Exemplarity 0.19 0.12 0.08 2.44 .028 
Studied × Item Exemplarity -0.23 -0.11 0.09 -2.52 .025 
 
Note. The reference level of condition is set to “novel”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Graded perceptual 
confusability measures were reported in the model above. See Material and Methods, and Variables of 





Principal Component Analysis of Nuisance Variables in Experiment 2 
 Components   
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Nb of non-white pixel -0.203  -0.675 -0.116  -0.229 0.112 
Color entropy      -0.989    
Mean BAS 0.602      -0.238 
Mean FAS 0.744       0.257 
PND                                                      -0.924 
Familiarity 0.198  -0.733 0.108  -0.207  
Word co-occurrence         0.992    
Concreteness  0.706      
Age of acquisition      -0.947  
Word frequency  0.707      
 
Note. The top 7 principal components from the PCA with varimax rotation of nuisance variables. 




Model Selection for Experiment 2 
Model  AICc ΔAICc AICcWt Cum.Wt LL 
Concept + Item + PCs 
Concept + Item 
Item + PCs 
Item 




17597.96 0.00 0.89 0.89 -8768.93 
17602.07 4.12 0.11 1.00 -8778.00 
17660.69 62.73 0.00 1.00 -8806.31 
17665.99 68.03 0.00 1.00 -8815.98 
17854.98 257.02 0.00 1.00 -8909.47 
17862.95 264.99 0.00 1.00 -8920.47 
23836.19 6238.23 0.00 1.00 -11908.09 
23856.48 6258.53 0.00 1.00 -11925.24 
 
Note. Summary of AICc results for models including concept-level, item-level, and confounds 




Effects of Semantic and Perceptual Variables on Raw Recognition Measures in Experiment 2
 
 
Note. Plots show effects of semantic and perceptual variables on raw recognition responses by item 
type. The plot lines represent the raw probabilities of endorsing studied items as “old” (light blue), lures 
as “old” (orange), and novel items as “old” (grey). Panel A, B, and C show the effects of concept 
confusability, item exemplarity, and C1 visual confusability in Experiment 2. Note that for concept-
level variables (concept confusability) there are data points for each concept, and for item-level 
variables (item exemplarity and C1 visual confusability) there are data points for each exemplar image. 
The clustering around discrete values of p(“old”) reflects the small numbers of observations for 
individual exemplars, as 300 of 1800 images were randomly allocated to the 3 test conditions for each 
participant (see Experiment 2, Materials and Methods, Stimuli). 
Table 10 
Results Including Study Set Size Effects for Experiment 2 
  
Variable Estimate d’ SE z-value p 

























Number of Features -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.30 .890 
Concept Confusability 0.09 0.06 0.05 1.71 .162 
Visual Confusability (C1) 0.13 0.07 0.04 2.94 .010 
Visual Confusability (C2) 0.06 0.03 0.05 1.31 .304 
Color Confusability 0.08 0.05 0.04 1.81 .135 
Item Exemplarity 0.43 0.25 0.05 9.52 <.001 
Novel × Number of Features 











Studied-Set2 × Number of Features 











Novel × Concept Confusability 
Lure-Set8 × Concept Confusability 
Studied-Set2 × Concept Confusability 
Studied-Set8 × Concept Confusability 
Novel × Visual Confusability (C1) 
Lure-Set8 × Visual Confusability (C1) 
Studied-Set2 × Visual Confusability (C1) 
Studied-Set8 × Visual Confusability (C1) 
Novel × Visual Confusability (C2) 
Lure-Set8 × Visual Confusability (C2) 
Studied-Set2 × Visual Confusability (C2) 
Studied-Set8 × Visual Confusability (C2) 
Novel × Color Confusability 
Lure-Set8 × Color Confusability 
Studied-Set2 × Color Confusability 
Studied-Set8 × Color Confusability 
Novel × Item Exemplarity 
Lure-Set8 × Item Exemplarity  
Studied-Set2 × Item Exemplarity 






































































































Note. The reference level of condition is set to “Lure-Set2”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Nearest neighbour  
perceptual confusability measures were reported in the model above. See Material and Methods, and 





Results of Experiment 2 Using Graded Perceptual Confusability Metrics 
  
Variable Estimate d’ SE z-value p  
(Intercept) -2.71 -1.55 0.10 -26.66 <.001 
Lure 2.36 1.34 0.07 31.98 <.001 
Studied 4.20 2.44 0.08 54.11 <.001 
Number of Features -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.16 .917 
Concept Confusability 0.29 0.15 0.07 4.05 <.001 
Visual Confusability (C1) 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.80 .589 
Visual Confusability (C2) 0.30 0.14 0.08 3.96 <.001 
Color Confusability 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.30 .896 
Item Exemplarity 0.17 0.09 0.07 2.41 .030 
Lure × Number of Features 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.04 .969 
Studied × Number of Features -0.08 -0.05 0.07 -1.10 .405 
Lure × Concept Confusability -0.22 -0.10 0.07 -3.09 .005 
Studied × Concept Confusability -0.51 -0.27 0.07 -6.97 <.001 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C1) -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.75 .597 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C1) -0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.23 .908 
Lure × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.25 -0.11 0.08 -3.12 .005 
Studied × Visual Confusability (C2) -0.23 -0.10 0.08 -2.84 .009 
Lure × Color Confusability -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.57 .699 
Studied × Color Confusability -0.11 -0.05 0.07 -1.54 .218 
Lure × Item Exemplarity 












Note. The reference level of condition is set to “novel”. Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, 
standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are listed for condition, concept-level, and item-
level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model selected with AIC. Graded perceptual 
confusability measures were reported in the model above. See Material and Methods, and Variables of 












Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
Table 12 
Results for Between-Experiment comparison 
  













Experiment 2 × Lure 











Experiment 2 × Number of Features 











Experiment 2 × Visual Confusability (C1) -0.15 -0.07 0.09 -1.74 .174 
Experiment 2 × Visual Confusability (C2) 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.79 .604 
Experiment 2 × Color Confusability 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.50 .766 
Experiment 2 × Item Exemplarity -0.06 -0.02 0.09 -0.65 .700 
Experiment 2 × Lure × Number of Features 
Experiment 2 × Studied × Number of Features 
Experiment 2 × Lure × Concept Confusability 
Experiment 2 × Studied × Concept Confusability 
Experiment 2 × Lure × Visual Confusability (C1)  
Experiment 2 × Studied × Visual Confusability (C1)  
Experiment 2 × Lure × Visual Confusability (C2)  
Experiment 2 × Studied × Visual Confusability (C2)  
Experiment 2 × Lure × Color Confusability  
Experiment 2 × Studied × Color Confusability  
Experiment 2 × Lure × Item Exemplarity  






























































Note. The reference levels of condition and experiment are set to “novel” and “Experiment 1”. 
Parameter estimates (logOR), d’ equivalent, standard errors, z-values, and FDR-corrected p-values are 
listed for condition, concept-level, and item-level variables in the winning (full) linear mixed model 
selected with AIC. Nearest neighbor perceptual confusability measures were used in the model above. 
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